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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In the Respondent's Brief the State asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an 
incorrect legal standard," contrary to ldaho code section 18-8005(8) and State v. 
Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007), in arguing that his conviction for 
actual physical control was not substantially conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) 
The State also argues that Mr. Moore's argument that his guilty plea to actual physical 
control was invalid is contrary to existing law and that counsel failed to cite directly 
contrary authority. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) This Reply Brief is necessary to 
address these assertions made by the State. Mr. Moore contends that the State has 
misinterpreted section 18-8005(8) and Schmoll, and that a proper application 
demonstrates that his conviction for actual physical control is not a substantially 
conforming conviction. Additionally, the State's representation that Mr. Moore's 
argument that his guilty plea was invalid is contrary to existing law, misrepresents the 
arguments made in the Appellant's Brief. Furthermore, a proper reading of the authority 
cited by the State reveals that it is not directly contrary authority. Mr. Moore refers this 
Court to his Appellant's Brief for his arguments on the remaining issues not addressed 
in this Reply Brief. 
Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict Mr. Moore of felony operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol? 
ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Su~port The Mr. Moore's 
Conviction For Felonv Operatins A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol 
A. Introduction 
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Moore argued that the district court erred in allowing 
the State to use his prior conviction for actual physical control of a vehicle because it 
was not a substantially conforming conviction, and that his guilty plea to this charge was 
invalid because it was obtained without counsel. In its Respondent's Brief, the State 
asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an incorrect legal standard" contrary to ldaho code 
section 18-8005(8) and State v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007), 
in arguing that his conviction for actual physical control was not substantially 
conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) The State also asserts that Mr. Moore's 
argument that his guilty plea to actual physical control was invalid is contrary to existing 
law and that counsel failed to cite directly contrary authority. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7- 
8.) Mr. Moore contends that the State has misinterpreted section 18-8005(8) and 
Schmoll, and that a proper application demonstrates that his conviction for actual 
physical control is not a substantially conforming conviction. Additionally, the State's 
representation that Mr. Moore's argument that his guilty plea was invalid is contrary to 
existing law, misrepresents the arguments made in the Appellant's Brief. Furthermore, a 
proper reading of authority cited by the State as directly contrary authority establishes 
that it is not directly contrary. 
B. The North Dakota Statute Was Not Substantiallv Conformincl With ldaho 
Code 5 18-8004 
In its Respondent's Brief the State asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an incorrect 
legal standard," contrary to ldaho code section 18-8005(8) and State v. Schmoll, 144 
ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007), in arguing that his conviction for actual 
physical control was not substantially conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) The 
State essentially argues that to determine whether a prior conviction for driving under 
the influence is a substantially conforming conviction, the courts should focus solely on 
the bare language outlining the elements of driving under the influence in the applicable 
statutes, without regard to how these elements have been defined within the applicable 
statute or by the courts. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) This argument misinterprets 
Schmoll and ignores the remainder of § 18-8004 defining the elements of driving under 
the influence. 
In Schmoll, the ldaho Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether a felony 
driving under the influence conviction in Montana, which would have been treated as a 
misdemeanor conviction in ldaho if committed here, could be used as a prior felony to 
enhance a subsequent driving under the influence conviction in ldaho to a felony. Id. at 
805, 172 P.3d at 560. In its analysis, the Court looked at how several other jurisdictions 
had determined whether a prior driving under the influence charge was substantially 
conforming. Id. at 801-03, 172 P.2d at 556-58. The Court noted the distinction between 
the approach in California, where the courts looked at the factual circumstances of the 
underlying conviction in determining whether the conviction was substantially 
conforming, and the approach taken in other jurisdictions, where the courts focused on 
the elements of the offense rather than the underlying facts of the prior convictions or 
the penalties for the convictions. Id. The Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the 
approach taken by the California courts. Id. at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60. 
Notably, in Schmoll, although the Court of Appeals did compare the elements 
that constitute driving under influence in Montana and ldaho under the applicable 
statues, implying they were substantially conforming, this was not the question before 
the Court. Schmoll, 144 ldaho at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60. Instead the Court of 
Appeals found that the question before it was whether the violation would result in a 
misdemeanor or felony charge in ldaho, and that this question was "entirely 
independent" from whether Montana's prohibition of driving under the influence 
substantially conforms to Idaho's prohibition. Id. at 805, 172 P.3d at 560. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State contends that Schmoll either expressly or 
implicitly rejected the idea that the Court should review how the applicable foreign 
statute has been interpreted by the courts of that state to determine if it is substantially 
conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) However Schmoll did not reject this idea, but 
in fact looked to how Montana had defined the elements of the crime through case law 
and the applicable statute. Schmoll, 144 ldaho at 804, 172 P.3d 555 ("A person is 
considered to be under the influence in Montana when his 'ability to safely operate a 
vehicle has been diminished.' M.C.A. § 61-8-401(3)(a). Diminished in this contest 
means 'reduced or to a lesser degree."') (quoting Stafe v. Polaski, 325 Mont. 351, 355, 
106 P.3d 538, 542 (Mont. 2005)). Therefore, comparing how the elements of driving 
under the influence have been defined in each state to determine whether they are 
substantially conforming is not contrary to Schmoll. Furthermore, not looking to how a 
jurisdiction has defined the elements of driving under the influence would lead to ldaho 
courts essentially interpreting other state's statutes for them despite contrary 
interpretations by that state. 
The State's argument in the Respondent's Brief, also ignores other subsections 
of ldaho Code section 18-8004 further defining the elements of driving under the 
influence. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) As the State notes, under Idaho code section 
18-8005(5), to be a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, the violation of 
law in another jurisdiction must substantially conform "to the provisions of section 18- 
8004, ldaho Code." However, the State only compares one provision of ldaho Code 
section 18-8004, provision (l)(a), with the applicable North Dakota statute, despite the 
language in ldaho code section 18-8005(5) applying it to all of ldaho code section 18- 
8004 provisions. This analysis ignores ldaho Code section 18-8004(5), specifically 
stating that actual physical control "shall be defined as being in the driver's position of 
the motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving." I.C. § 18- 
8004(5). It also ignores ldaho code section 18-8004(2), specifying that in ldaho a 
person with a blood alcohol content below .08 cannot be prosecuted for driving under 
the influence, unless they are also under the influence of drugs, driving a commercial 
vehicle, or are a minor. I.C. 3 18-8004(2). The fact the legislature specifically sought to 
limit or define certain elements in ldaho code section 18-8004 and section 18-8005(5) 
states that a foreign conviction must substantially conform with the provisions of section 
18-8004, not just subsection 18-8004(1)(a), indicates that the foreign conviction must be 
substantially conforming with these definitions or limitations as well. Here, Mr. Moore's 
underlying conviction for actual physical control was not substantially conforming with 
either subsection 18-8004(2) or 18-8004(5). (See Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12, 13-14.) 
Because the North Dakota elements for driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while intoxicated are not substantially conforming with ldaho code section 
18-8004, and would allow convictions in much broader circumstances than in ldaho, the 
district court erred in denying Mr. Moore's motion in limine and allowing the North 
Dakota conviction to be used to enhance Mr. Moore's DUI to a felony. Therefore, the 
prosecution failed to present substantial competent evidence at the time of trial to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Moore was guilty of felony driving under the 
influence. 
C. Mr. Moore's Guilty Plea In North Dakota Was Obtained Without A Knowinq 
Voluntaw Waiver Of His Riqht To Counsel 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Moore "argues that the state 
had the burden of proving that his waiver of counsel in North Dakota was knowing and 
voluntary," stating that this is contrary to law and that counsel failed to cite Tovar v. 
Iowa, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) as directly contrary authority. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8 
& n.3.) However, this was not the argument that was made in the Appellant's Brief and 
Tovar is not directly contrary authority as the State asserts. 
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Moore made the following argument regarding the 
burden of proof to collaterally attack an uncounseled underlying conviction: 
In order to make the required showing, the State is only obligated to 
prove the existence of the convictions through copies of the judgments of 
conviction or other evidence. Sfafe v. Coby, 128 ldaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 
762, 764 (1996). Once the State has met its burden, the defendant has 
the burden of coming forward with some evidence that the conviction was 
constitutionally defective. Id. However, if the defendant raises a triable 
issue of fact that the defendant was not accorded all of their rights on the 
previous convictions, the burden is then on the State to rebut the 
defendant's evidence and prove there were no constitutional infirmities. 
Miller, 131 ldaho at 295, 955 P.2d at 610; Sfafe v. Beloit, 123 ldaho 36, 
37, 844 P.2d 18, 19 (1992). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) This argument is clearly not that the State has the burden 
to prove Mr. Moore's waiver was knowing and voluntary as the State asserts, but rather 
an explanation of how the ldaho Courts determine the respective burdens of the State 
and the defense. Sfafe v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 295, 955 P.2d 603, 610 (Ct. App. 
1997). The burden shifts first from the State to the defense, and then from the defense 
to the State, only if a triable issue of fact is presented. Id. This standard was first 
adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court in Sfafe v. Beloif, 123 ldaho 36, 37, 844 P.2d 18, 
19 (1992) overruled on ofher grounds by Sfafe v. Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 
(2004) following the United State's Supreme Court's Opinion in Parke v. Raley, 506 
U.S. 20 (1992) and has not been overruled by the ldaho Supreme Court. See Weber, 
140 ldaho at 94, 90 P.3d at 319. 
In Raley, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether 
Kentucky's standard for determining the validity of a prior conviction was 
unconstitutional because the State was not required to carry the entire burden of proof. 
See Raley, 506 U.S. at 22. Under Kentucky's standard, which is similar to the standard 
adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court and argued by the Appellant in this case, the 
burden begins with the State to demonstrate that the existence of the conviction; the 
burden then shifts to the defense to produce evidence that his rights were infringed or 
some procedural irregularity occurred; if the defendant does this, the burden shifts back 
to the State to demonstrate that the judgment was entered in a manner protecting the 
defendant's rights. Id. at 24. See Beloit, 123 ldaho at 37, 844 P.2d at 19; Miller, 131 
ldaho at 295, 955 P.2d at 610; (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.). The Court ultimately held 
that this test did not infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights, leaving it up to the 
states to determine exactly what procedures they would proscribe as long as it did not 
infringe on the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 27-28. 
Nothing in Tovaroverrules this holding by the Raley Court. See Tovar, 541 U.S. 
77, generally. The passage cited by the State from Tovar stating that "it is the 
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right 
to the assistance of counsel,"' is simply applying the burden of persuasion applied by 
the lowa courts in the collateral attack of an uncounseled conviction by the defendant. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92 (citing Watfs v. Sfafe, 257 N.W.2d 70, 71 (lowa 1977).). As Tovar 
originated in lowa, and, as noted in Raley, the Supreme Court has left it up to the states 
to determine the procedures for implementing recidivism statutes, the Court would 
naturally apply the applicable lowa law to determine what burden of persuasion applied 
to which party. Raley, 506 U.S. at 27-28, Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92. Therefore, Tovar is not 
directly contrary to the burdens of persuasion set forth in the Appellant's Brief, as the 
State has attempted to assert. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction for felony driving 
under the influence be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
conviction for the felony enhancement. Alternatively, he contends that his judgment of 
conviction be vacated and his case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
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